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NOTES AND- COMMENTS
Labor Law-Railway Labor Act--7Use of Union Funds
for Non-bargainable Purposes
The right to work or to be employed is property within the
meaning of due process and is entitled to legal protection.' One
cannot be deprived of the right to work by an arbitrary mandate of
the legislature ;' however, the right is subject to reasonable regulation
under statutes enacted in the exercise of the police power.3 Many
states,4 including North Carolina,' have enacted statutes6 or consti-
tutional provisions7 providing that no one shall be denied an op-
portunity to attain or retain employment because he is or' is not
a member of a labor organization. These laws outlaw both union
and closed shop agreements.8 However, it has been held that
these state laws must yield to federal laws permitting such union
security provisions in a field over which the federal government has
jurisdiction.'
One such federal law is the Railway Labor Act. This act was
amended in 1951 to authorize a labor organization to make agree-
ments with carriers requiring membership in the organization as a
condition of employment.' 0 Membership under such an agreement
'Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
'Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
'Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
" Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Missis-
sippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah and Virginia. The "Right to Work"
law in Louisiana is limited to agricultural and certain processing workers.
See Pollitt, Right to Work Law Issues: An Evidentiary Approach, 37 N.C.L.
REv. 233 (1959).
'See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-78 to -84 (1958).
o See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-901 to -09 (1961).
" See, e.g., FLA. CONsT., Declaration of Rights § 12.
'For the effect of these laws on the agency shop, see Johanneson, Recent
Decisions Concerning the Agency Shop, 40 N.C.L. REV. 603 (1962).
'Hudson v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E.2d 441, cert. denied,
351 U.S. 949 (1956).
10 64 Stat. 1238, 45 U.S.C. § 152, which provides in part: "any carrier or
carriers as defined in this Chapter and a labor organization or labor organiza-
tions duly designated and authorized to represent employees in accordance
with the requirements of this Act shall be permitted (a) to make agree-
ments, requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that . . . all
employees shall become members of the labor organization representing their
craft or class. Provided, That no such agreement shall require such condition
of employment with respect to employees to whom membership is not available
upon the same terms and conditions as are generally applicable'to any other
member or with respect to employees to whom membership was denied or
terminated for any other than the failure of the employee to tender the
1963]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cannot, however, be denied or terminated for any reason other than
the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues, initiation fees,
and assessments."'
The constitutionality of security agreements entered into pursu-
ant to the union shop amendment was attacked in Hanson v. Union
Pac. R.R.' 2 In this case the plaintiffs sought to restrain the carrier
and the unions from putting into effect union shop agreements con-
taining provisions expressly authorized by the union shop amend-
ment. The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the enforcement
of these contract provisions would deprive the plaintiffs of the free-
dom to join or not to join in association with others as guaranteed
by the first amendment, and would deprive them of property without
due process of law, as guaranteed by the fifth amendment, by re-
quiring them to pay for many things besides the cost of collective
bargaining. The defendants appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, which reversed.13 In upholding the constitutionality of the
union shop amendment, the Court stated that it was enacted pursuant
to the power of Congress under the commerce clause,14 and super-
ceded any state law to the contrary by its express terms and, there-
fore, by force of the supremacy clause of the federal constitution.1"
In Allen v. Southern Ry.'0 the North Carolina Supreme Court
was presented with a similar constitutional question. In this case
non-union employees of the railroad sought an injunction to restrain
.collection from them of dues, fees, or assessments not reasonably
necessary and related to collective bargaining. The trial court en-
joined the collections but provided that if the union would present
proof as to what portion would be reasonably necessary to collective
bargaining, such portion could be collected. The defendants appealed
to the North Carolina Supreme Court which, in reversing, stated:
"'the very questions now raised by plaintiffs were before the Court
and decided in Hanson . . . ,'7 The court interpreted Hanson as
holding that a requirement that plaintiffs pay ordinary periodic dues
periodic dues, initiation fees and penalties, uniformly required as a condition
of acquiring or retaining membership."
11Ibid.
12 160 Neb. 669, 71 N.W.2d 526 -(1955).
Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
", U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
1 U.S. COiST. art. 6, § 2.
' 249 N.C. 491, 107 S.E.2d 125 (1959).17Id. at 504, 107 S.E.2d at 133.
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and initiation fees uniformly required of all members violates neither
the first nor the fifth amendments.
Plaintiffs, however, contended that the questions raised in Allen
were not decided by Hanson but were, in fact, expressly reserved.
In support of their contention, plaintiffs cite language of Justice
Douglas, who, in writing for the majority of the Court in Hanson,
stated: "If assessments are in fact imposed for purposes not germane
to collective bargaining, a different problem would be presented.""8
The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, was of the opinion
that the questions reserved in Hanson would arise only if and when
defendant-unions should undertake to deny membership or to termi-
nate membership because of the failure of plaintiffs to comply with
the various regulations applicable to voluntary members, e.g. refusal
to sign application blanks or failure to attend meetings. 9
After the adverse decision of the North Carolina court, the plain-
tiffs filed a petition for rehearing. The petition was allowed, but the
court deferred rehearing pending the decision of the United States
Supreme Court on a case on appeal from the state of Georgia. In
this case, Internatiotal Ass'n of Machinists v. Street,20 the plaintiffs
sought to enjoin the enforcement of a union shop agreement entered
into pursuant to the Railway Labor Act. Plaintiffs alleged that the
agreement required as a condition of continued employment that the
employees pay union dues which would be used to support political
and economic programs, and candidates for office opposed by the
plaintiffs. The trial court granted the relief sought, and this was
affirmed on appeal by the Georgia Supreme Court which held
that the union shop agreement violated the plaintiffs' right to free-
dom of speech and deprived them of their property without due
process of law. The defendants appealed to the United States
Supreme Court which reversed the holding as to the constitutional
issues.2 ' While recognizing that the case squarely presented "the
Id. at 503, 107 S.E.2d at 133, citing from 351 U.S. at 238 (1956).19In a dissenting opinion, Justice Parker felt that the case presented the
very question reserved in Hanson, and that it was not within the concept of
due process to compel a person to contribute dues and fees from his earnings
for the purpose of promoting political and ideological ends to which he is
opposed, and of electing men to public office whose purposes he may distrust,
and if he does not so contribute to discharge him from his job with loss of
seniority.
20215 Ga. 27, 108 S.E.2d 796 (1959).
2 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
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constitutional questions reserved in Hanson"22 as to the use of
exacted funds for political purposes opposed by the employees, the
Court avoided deciding these questions by construing the Railway
Labor Act to deny such use of the funds."3 The case was remanded
to the Georgia Supreme Court for consideration of a proper remedy.24
After the decision of the Supreme Court in Street, a rehearing
was held in the Allen case. This time,2" the court was equally
divided. 6  Thus, the trial court was affirmed without becoming
precedent. As a result, the union must prove what portion of the
Id. at 749.
28 In Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961), a companion case with
Street, a Wisconsin lawyer brought an action to recover dues paid to the
integrated state bar. He alleged that the bar "has used its.., funds in active
opposition to the adoption of legislation which" he favored. Id. at 822. Al-
though the case arose on a demurrer, a plurality of the Court again refused
to consider the constitutional issues because plaintiff did not indicate "whether
any of his dues were used to support the State Bar's positions." Id. at 846.
See note 30 infra.
24 The United States Supreme Court stated that appropriate remedies in
such a case do not include an ifijtftfction against the enforcement of a union
shop agreement, or an injunction barring the union from collecting any funds
from its objecting members, nor an injunction against all expenditures for
the disputed purposes, even if the injunction is conditioned on cessation of the
improper expenditures. The Court suggested, however, that appropriate
remedies would include (1) an injunction against expenditures, for political
causes opposed by the complaining employee, of a sum which is so much of
the money exacted from him as is the proportion of the union's total expendi-
tures made for such political activities to the union's total budget, or (2)
restitution to an individual employee of that portion of his money which
the union expended for the political causes to which he had advised the
union he was opposed. In the latter remedy, the portion of his money the
employee would be entitled to recover would be in the same proportion that
the expenditures for political purposes which he had advised the union he
disapproved bore to the total union budget.
"Allen v. Southern Ry., 256 N.C. 700, 124 S.E.2d 871 (1962).
28justice Sharp declined to take part in the consideration of the rehearing
because she had presided at the hearing of the case and had entered an inter-
locutory order at the superior court level.
" The court cited two North Carolina cases, Schoenith v. Town & Coun-
try Realty Co., 244 N.C. 601, 94 S.E.2d 592 (1956) and Ward v. Odell Mfg.
Co., 126 N.C. 946, 36 S.E. 194 (1900), to support the proposition that the
trial court should be affirmed. However, neither of these cases involved a
rehearing. Actually, it would seem that the law in North Carolina is con-
trary to the result of this decision. See' Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S.
454 (1940) where the United States Supreme Court in commenting on the
history of the case stated: "The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed
and then, being evenly divided on rehearing, allowed the reversal to stand."
311 U.S. at 455. The case was reversed by the Supreme Court on other
grourids.
The few cases which have decided the point elsewhere are in conflict. See
Pitton v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 144 Fla. 462, 198 So. 503 (1940), holding that an
equal. division of the court on rehearing works an affirmance of the previous
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exacted funds would be reasonably necessary to collective bargaining.
Otherwise, it would be enjoined from making any further collections
from union members.
A view somewhat analogous to that taken by the North Carolina
trial court was taken by the Supreme Court of Georgia" when con-
sidering the Street case on remand from the United States Supreme
Court. Here the Court directed the trial court to determine the
amount being expended for non-bargainable purposes, and to enter
a decree accordingly. If the trial court was unable to make this
determination, it was directed to enjoin the union from spending any
money for political purposes.
The view taken by the North Carolina trial court would seem
to be a desirable one since it would be impractical, if not impossible,
for a union member to prove what portion of his dues and assess-
ments were being expended for non-bargainable purposes. Under
this view the union members would be required only to prove that
some of the union funds were being used for non-bargainable pur-
poses. The court would then enjoin further collections and expendi-
tures until the union could prove how much was being used for
bargainable purposes.
In conclusion, it may only be said that this area of the law remains
in a state of confusion. The Street case, while authority for the
proposition that the Railway Labor Act prohibits compulsory contri-
butions by union members to non-bargainable political purposes,
leaves the constitutional issues unanswered. Lathrop v. Donohue,
29
a companion case with Street, merely adds further confusion to the
law. Although a majority of the members of the Court agreed in
Lathrop that the constitutional issues were properly raised,30 the
opinion of the appellate court and not an affirmance of the judgment appealed
from, when the original judgment was reversed and Richards v. Burden, 59
Iowa 723, 13 N.W. 90 (1882), holding that the lower court would be affirmed
in such a case.
This point of the Allen case will be commented on in the Tenth Annual
Survey of North Carolina Case Law, which will appear in a later issue of
the Law Review.
"8 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 217 Ga. 351, 122 S.E.2d
220 (1961).
° 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
Five members of the Court agreed that a constitutional question was
raised. Of these five, two felt that a state can, without violating the constitu-
tion, compel a lawyer to pay dues to be used in part for support of legislation
which he opposes. Another member felt that a state may require ''that a
lawyer pay to its designee an annual fee ... as a condition of its grant, or of
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effect of the decision is, perhaps, best summed up by Justice Black,
who, in a dissent, states: "I do not believe that either the bench,
the bar or the litigants will know what has been decided in this
case-certainly I do not."- The problem is further complicated in
North Carolina due to the fact that the court on rehearing the
Allen case did not refer to the constitutional issues in its opinion.
In any event, the court was equally divided and, therefore, the hold-
ing of the case, whatever it may be, is not precedent for future
litigation. JERRY W. Amos
Associate Editor
Torts-Judicial Abrogation of the Doctrine of Municipal
Immunity to Tort Liability
In Holytz v. City of Milwaukee1 an action was brought by a
three-and-one-half year old infant against the defendant municipality
for injuries sustained when a steel trap door, covering a water meter
pit, fell on her hands. An action was also brought by the infant's
father to recover for medical expenses incurred by him as a result
of his child's injuries, and for damages due to loss of her society
and companionship. The injuries occurred while the infant was
using a playground maintained by the defendant for pre-school aged
children. It was alleged that the employees of the defendant had
negligently allowed the trap door to remain open.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, reversing the trial court which
had sustained the defendant's demurrer, held that the municipality
was not immune from liability for its negligent torts. In so holding,
Wisconsin joined at least four other states2 which have abolished by
continuing its grant, to him of the special privilege . . . of practicing law
in the State." Id. at 865. Two members agreed that the powers conferred
on the bar violated both the first and fourteenth amendments. Finally, a
plurality of four members refused to consider the constitutional issues. Cf.,
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948) and United States v. International
Union UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957) construing 18 U.S.C. § 610 which pro-
hibits any corporation or labor organization from making "a contribution or
expenditure in connection with any election to any political office....
1" 367 U.S. at 865.
'17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
' California, see Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Florida, see Hargrove v. Town of
Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Illinois, see Molitor v. Kaneland
Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959) ; Michi-
gan, see Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961).
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